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The assumption that both domestic politics and international relations are characterised by an 
original condition of anarchy, which can only be regulated by the artifice of a formal social contract 
and a system of sovereign states, underpins much of modern political thought and IR theory, 
especially the realist tradition (Murray 1997: 31-143; Rengger 2000: 37-71; Bell 2008). In the wake 
of Kenneth WaltzÕ Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979), the neo-realist claim about 
uncertainty and the permanent risk of inter-state conflict has been challenged by both neo-liberal 
thinkers and theorists of constructivism. The former tend to emphasise the varieties of cooperative 
behaviour between states as part of international institutions (e.g. Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 
1989). Meanwhile, the latter tend to accentuate inter-subjectively shared ideas that shape action by 
constituting the identities and interests of both state and non-state actors (Wendt 1992, 1999; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Reus-Smit 1999, 2004; Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2006). 
It is true that neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism differ fundamentally on key 
questions such as the nature of the international system, the extent to which states are driven by 
national interest and whether identities are exogenously given or socially constructed. However, as 
this essay will suggest, they also share a number of foundational assumptions, including (1) the 
existence of anarchy not only in the state of nature but also in the international system; (2) the 
individual and the state as the key units of domestic politics and international relations; (3) the 
separation of ideational from material forces and a residually dualist ontology (oscillating between 
the self and the other). By contrast, there are elements of the English School of IR Ð in some of the 
writings by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight Ð that provide an alternative conception to the 
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three dominant discourses, notably (1) the existence of order both in the state of nature and in the 
international system; (2) the primacy of communities, groups and other associations over the 
individual and the state; (3) the fusion of ideas with material forces and a more fully relational 
ontology. 
This paper argues that one source for this alternative conception is the work of Edmund Burke 
who viewed political association as more primary than anarchy and as naturally given (in the sense 
of reflecting a natural order) rather than socially constructed. Wight himself hinted at the 
importance of BurkeÕs intellectual legacy for the English School of IR in his seminal essay ÔWhy is 
there no international theory?Õ, where he writes that Òthe only political philosopher who has turned 
wholly from political theory to international theory is BurkeÓ (Wight, 1966: 19). Both in his 
speeches and writings Burke articulates a new approach to the political and the international that 
focuses on the primacy of association: cultural and social bonds that are more primary than the 
social contract or the inter-state system. Such ties involve reciprocal rights and mutual duties Ð 
Ôobligations written in the heartÕ (Burke 2014b: 316) Ð which Burke viewed as more fundamental 
than formal legal or procedural arrangements as expressed in treaties (or, arguably, much of 
international law today). 
Contrary to certain strands in constructivism, Burke considers associative ties not as socially 
constructed but rather as reflecting a natural order governed by custom, tradition and the experience 
of connectedness in which communities and groups embody the political and social nature of 
humankind. Such an order is reflected in their participation in a Ôcommonwealth of nationsÕ that is 
governed by a transcendent morality given to humanity by God (Burke 1993c). And contrary to 
more ÔculturalistÕ approaches (e.g. Huntington 1996 and 2004, and in a very different way, Lebow 
2003, 2009 and 2014), Burke views identity not in essentialist terms but instead as an organically 
evolving reality that is shaped by both ideas and material forces. My argument is that BurkeÕs more 
ÔorganicistÕ approach avoids both the view that identity is essentialist, fixed and immutable and the 
notion of identity as fragmented, in flux and permanently changing. Instead, he conceives of being, 
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community and identity in terms of living traditions Ð a covenantal link among generations that 
connects the past with the present and the future. 
Section one explores the conception of association in constructivist and ÔculturalistÕ theories 
of IR and shows that in each case, there is a dualism between ideas and material forces that reflects 
a secular logic Ð a separation of immanence from transcendence that underpins an ontology that is 
ultimately idealist. Section two provides an analysis of BurkeÕs critique of the modern secular 
settlement before outlining his ÔassociationistÕ alternative and the way in which this approach 
informed his analyses and actions on the burning questions of international affairs in his day. 
Section three discusses a number of possible objections to BurkeÕs approach and tries to show how 
BurkeÕs associationism contributes to the solution of perennial problems in IR theory, including the 
reality of human vice, violence and war, before the final section offers some concluding reflections 
and outlines future avenues of research. 
 
1. A critique of constructivist and ÔculturalistÕ conceptions of association 
 
The idea of association and culture in politics and international relations is not new, but it has 
recently come once again to the fore. The argument that human association is more primary than 
either the sovereign individual or the sovereign state because humankind is always already political 
can be traced to ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, as well as to medieval and 
some modern thinkers in Western tradition (Pickstock 2012; Pabst 2016; Rengger 2016). Over the 
past two decades or so, the idea of the international as a ÔthickÕ order of interpersonal relations that 
generate cross-border connections, including language and cultural customs, has received renewed 
attention in IR by certain strands in the constructivist school (e.g. Wendt 1992, 1999; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998; Reus-Smit 1999, 2004; Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 
2006). In different ways, they emphasise the role of inter-subjectively shared ideas rather than 
material forces in shaping political action by constituting the identities and interests of states and 
other actors in the international arena. 
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1.1. Constructivist accounts of association 
 
The constructivist conception of association derives from an important critique of neo-realist and 
neo-liberal approaches to the international. As John Gerard Ruggie (1998) and Alexander Wendt 
(1992 and 1999) have argued, the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism is an intra-
paradigmatic one. Both schools of IR view the international system as characterised by anarchy, 
which is regulated through a combination of structure (distribution of power) and process 
(institutional interaction).
1
 Both are also committed to rationalism and utilitarianism: in the words 
of Ruggie, Ô[w]ithin the ontology of neo-utilitarianism, ideational factors, when they are examined 
at all, are rendered in strictly instrumental terms, useful or not to self-regarding individuals (units) 
in the pursuit of typically material interests, including efficiency concernsÕ (Ruggie 1998: 855). 
Therefore both neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches consider identities and interests to be 
exogenously given, such that state actors might change their behaviour but not their essential 
identity or vital interests. As a result, the main disagreement between neo-realists and neo-liberals is 
about the relative importance of anarchic structure versus process-generated cooperative behaviour 
as part of the international system. Any association between states is based on a rationalist 
calculation of (relative or absolute) gains. 
Wendt rightly recognises that some (neo)-liberal theorists of IR go further and try to 
conceptualise forms of Ôcomplex learningÕ (Nye 1987), Ôchanging conceptions of self and interestÕ 
(Jervis 1988), or ÔsociologicalÕ approaches to interest (Keohane 1990). However, this raises 
questions about the tension between an individualist ontology and an inter-subjective epistemology 
that neo-liberalism cannot resolve because it is wedded to ontological individualism. In light of this, 
Wendt argues for an inter-subjective structure that can account for interest- and identity formation 
in a way that the rationalist separation of exogenously given structure from fluid process cannot. 
Key to this is what Wendt calls the distribution of knowledge based on ideas (as opposed to the 
  5 
distribution of power based on material interests) and the Ôcollective meanings that constitute the 
structures which organize our actionsÕ (Wendt 1992: 397). 
Crucially, as he claims in his influential book Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt 
1999), constructivism offers an alternative to neo-realism and neo-liberalism that revolves around 
two arguments: Ôthat the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas 
rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed 
by these shared ideas rather than given by natureÕ (Wendt 1999: 1). Against the philosophical 
materialism of the realist tradition in IR, WendtÕs variant of constructivism tries to show that the 
structures of human association are primarily to do with cultural factors rather than material forces. 
And against the philosophical rationalism of neo-liberal approaches, Wendtian constructivism seeks 
to establish that these culturally conditioned structures not merely regulate action but also build 
interests and identities. In WendtÕs own words, Ô[a]nalysis should therefore begin with culture and 
then move to power and interest, rather than only invoke culture to clean up what they leave 
unexplainedÕ (Wendt 1999: 193). 
Others, like Ruggie, focus on the Ôcivilizational constructs, cultural factors, state identities, 
and the like, together with how they shape statesÕ interests and patterns of international outcomesÕ 
(Ruggie 1998: 867). His argument is that core building blocs of the international system such as 
sovereignty, power or national interest exist only within a framework of shared meaning that 
recognises it to be legitimate precisely because underpinning it is some form of collective 
intentionality. As he notes, collective intentionality creates identity and meaning, including the case 
of negotiating trade agreements. The reason is Ôintersubjective frameworks of understanding that 
included a shared narrative about the conditions that had made the [trade] regimes necessary and the 
objectives they were intended to accomplish and generated a grammarÕ (Ruggie 1998: 870). So like 
many other constructivists (including Barnett, Finnemore, Keck, Reus-Smit and Sikkink), WendtÕs 
and RuggieÕs conceptions rest on the claim that identities and interests change as a result of social 
interaction Ð in particular the use of language. 
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But the linguistic turn of IR, which lies at the conceptual heart of constructivism, is not 
sufficiently developed. As Maja Zehfuss has shown, constructivist depictions of interactions lack 
communicative action: WendtÕs Ôactors do not speakÕ (Zehfuss 2002: 48), and the duality between 
the self (ego) and the other (alter) is in fact devoid of linguistic mediation. Thus actors are engaged 
in signalling games and in an exchange of discrete moves that resemble rationalist game theory 
more than continued social interaction based on a properly relational ontology. It is true that Wendt 
draws on Peter BergerÕs conception of identity, which he describes as relational: ÔActors acquire 
identities-relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self-by participating 
in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relationalÕ (Wendt 1992: 397). However, the 
ontology that underpins WendtÕs constructivism and the constructivist tradition of IR more widely 
is dualistic. Not only does it view the individual and the state as the fundamental units of politics 
and international relations without the mediation of groups, communities or other forms of 
association. It also considers ideas as separate from material forces, which alongside institutions are 
little more than external constraints on socially knowledgeable and discursively competent actors.  
The primacy of ideational over material factors implies that constructivism is a variant of 
idealism: reality is merely physical and given, devoid of any meaning except for the mentally and 
socially constructed meaning of individuals and their interaction with other individuals. The same is 
true for norms in the international system, which are but the outcome of states interacting with other 
states. Underpinning constructivist approaches is the premise that politics and the international 
system are ultimately composed of individuals and states and that these units have nothing 
ontological in common. Therefore, the political and the international rest on a relational social 
structure that is the outcome of ideas and interaction Ð a constructed artifice rather than a naturally 
given imperfect order that human beings try to discover and to improve. 
Thus we can summarise by saying that neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism differ 
fundamentally on key questions, such as the nature of the international system, the extent to which 
states are driven by national interest and whether identities are exogenously given or socially 
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constructed. However, they do share a number of foundational presuppositions, including (1) the 
existence of anarchy not only in the state of nature but also in the international system; (2) the 
individual and the state as the core units of domestic politics and international relations; (3) the 
separation of ideational from material forces. 
 
1.2. ÔCulturalistÕ approaches to association 
 
Among the most prominent ÔculturalistÕ approaches to IR and the question of association are the 
works of Samuel Huntington (1996 and 2004) and (much closer to social constructivism) the 
writings of Richard Ned Lebow (notably 2003, 2009, 2014). The focus of my critique will be on the 
latter because, like the constructivist tradition of IR, Lebow rejects the neo-realist assumption that 
the international is characterised by a condition of anarchy and that states are primarily engaged in 
the pursuit of national interest. Instead of a rationalist calculation of gain and loss, his contention is 
that actors in the international system are motivated in much more complex ways and that there is 
something like a commonwealth of nations bound together by notions of justice. LebowÕs emphasis 
is on the tragic character of international politics linked to the inherent difficult of establishing and 
maintaining an orderly conduct among nations, the contingent nature of human efforts to improve 
the material environment of individuals and states, as well as the fundamental condition of 
uncertainty, which according to him remains unaddressed in the constructivist work of Wendt and 
others (Lebow 2003). 
Faced with uncertain domestic and international contexts, actors do not simply fall back on 
power or national interests but have a much wider range of motives. For Lebow, political leaders 
draw on notions of honour, patriotism and charisma for their decisions and actions. These emotions 
and other motivations are part of a deeper philosophical dynamic between different poles that 
exceed the constructivist binary of self and other: LebowÕs culturalist approach accentuates the 
interplay between physis and nomos Ð a natural order and human conventions, customs and laws. 
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This interplay between nature and culture is key to the development of civilisations, their rise and 
their fall (Lebow 2012 and 2016).  
Beyond neo-realism, LebowÕs theory of IR emphasises cultural patterns that shape the 
interests and ideas of states and their exercise of power. And beyond social constructivism, his 
conception highlights the deep connections between natural order and human culture Ð culture is not 
just a pure social artifice but in some sense reflects an imperfect cosmic order, while this imperfect 
cosmic order requires human creativity for its preservation and perfection. Linking together nature 
and culture is logos Ð right reason in the sense of argumentative engagement and the fashioning of 
shared meanings within and between societies. These meanings are vital to the survival and 
flourishing of civilisations. For Lebow, Thucydides  
explored the relationship between words (logoi) and deeds (erga), and documented the 
double feedback loop between them. Shared meanings of words are the basis for 
conventions and civic cooperation. When words lose their meanings, or when their 
meanings are subverted, the conventions that depend on them lose their force, 
communication becomes difficult and civilization declines (Lebow 2003: 161).  
 
By contrast, international order and a shared sense of justice based on the cultivation of common 
bonds is central to a nomos that can restrain the worst excesses of actors Ð including individual 
leaders, city states or entire empires. Such a nomos involves a cultural understanding of the self-
image and self-esteem of other actors on the international stage among whom some shared interests 
and identities can be discerned. 
However, Lebow insists that the human condition is tragic in the sense of being subject not 
just to uncertainty but also to irreconcilable tension between opposing passions. As a result, both 
individual and collective identities are fragile and unstable, which in turn implies that persons and 
societies evolve according to non-linear patterns that are neither determined by fixed factors such as 
power (as for neo-realism), nor by law-like regularities (as for neo-liberalism), nor by inter-
subjectivity (as for constructivism). That is so because for Lebow the latter forgets the importance 
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of human interaction with reality or, to put the same point differently, the interplay of nature and 
culture. 
In other works, notably his Cultural Theory of International Relations (Lebow 2009), he 
argues that emotional motives of ÔappetiteÕ, ÔspiritÕ, ÔreasonÕ and ÔfearÕ, which are absent from the 
neo-realist, neo-liberal and constructivist traditions of IR, turn out to be central to human action and 
political behaviour Ð including the shaping of the international system. Fundamentally, these 
emotions interact with one another: for example, spirit or the drive for self-esteem can be sustained 
by reason or by fear. But beyond the rationalism of neo-realist and the neo-liberal approaches, 
Lebow makes the point that human nature is itself more holistic and integrated than and the 
emphasis on inter-subjectivity in constructivism: Ô[r]eason combined with positive affect in the 
form of affection builds empathyÕ; Ôreason divorced from emotional commitments [É] can 
intensify conflict and prevent the emergence of [É] communities that enable actors to [É] satisfy 
their spiritÕ (Lebow 2009: 514). Social order at the domestic and international level is in large part a 
reflection of rival emotions: reason-based arrangements tame spirit and appetite, which leads to 
self-restraint, while appetite-based arrangements induce selfishness, rapacity and conflict. Spirit-
based arrangements involve the pursuit of honour and therefore produce a competition for status, 
which is also unstable. 
Crucially, Lebow argues that such a cultural approach to IR is compatible with certain 
standard in the social sciences, including generalisation over time and across space: 
[b]y identifying roughly where societies reside within [the mixture of motives,] we can 
infer important things about their politics, including the basis and degree of cooperation, 
the nature of conflict and the frequency of violence or war, and actorsÕ propensity for 
risk-taking. With a large number of cases we could determine the distribution of 
societies across time and cultures to see if certain mixtures of motives were more 
common and stable than other configurations (Lebow 2009: 510-11). 
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Leaving aside the challenge of operationalising this theory, LebowÕs approach runs into a number 
of conceptual problems. First of all, Lebow is right to treat culture not as an epiphenomenon but 
rather as a force in its own right that shapes behaviour, but in his theory there is a tension between 
transhistorical continuities and contingent, contending factors. On the one hand, Lebow emphasises 
the universal motive of spirit, but on the other hand he privileges change over continuity and human 
agency over material structure. So is spirit always more important than other emotions and, if so, 
why? Or does that depend on historical context, which would suggest that even universal motives 
are subject to contingency. 
Connected with this is a second conceptual problem Ð a rationale for why hierarchies of 
standing and conceptions of honour are more fundamental than other factors in shaping political 
behaviour. Lebow shows how they emerge from continuous social interactions and are transformed 
by them, but he fails to account for why they are more central to identity than other factors, such as 
a sense of belonging. But so far he has not explained why the sources of political order are to be 
found purely in human nature and social interaction, which rest on the ontological assumption of 
individual substances rather than relational beings Ð beings in relationship with other beings. Both 
Lebow and Wendt assume that the natural and social sciences give us access to a physicalist 
ontology that grounds both the identities and interests of actors. Thereby they explicitly exclude all 
non-secular, metaphysical thinking that views relationality as more primary than substance and 
offers a more ÔorganicistÕ conception of being, community and identity (cf. Pabst 2012). Such a 
conception suggests that beings are in association with other beings in such a way that community 
and identity describe what is Ôwith usÕ beyond the dualism between the self and the other so beloved 
of constructivists. 
As the remainder of the essay will suggest, BurkeÕs more ÔorganicistÕ approach outflanks in 
advance two conceptions of identity Ð either as essentialist, fixed and immutable or as fragmented, 
in flux and permanently changing. Instead, Burke views being, community and identity in terms of 
living traditions Ð a covenantal link among generations that connects the past with the present and 
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the future. As Vincent (1984: 207) rightly remarks, Ôthe more general function of history in BurkeÕs 
thought [É] was to establish a context by means of which those merely temporary possessors of the 
commonwealth, the current generations, could be connected up to the past, and also to the future, of 
their societyÕ. This more relational ontology underpins BurkeÕs argument that the international can 
be conceptualised in terms of the primacy of association over the individual and the state. 
 
2. BurkeÕs conception of association 
2.1. Elements of political theology in BurkeÕs conception of the international 
BurkeÕs conception of the international represents an extension of his political thought, which is 
infused with numerous elements of political theology. To start with, there is BurkeÕs critique of the 
secular logic of anarchy and artifice on which the main traditions of IR theory rest. He rejects the 
Hobbesian idea of a violent and anarchic state of nature, which can be merely regulated by the 
central state and an international system of sovereign states. Nor does he agree with the 
Rousseauian notion that in the state of nature human beings do not depend on each other Ð pre-
social liberty as self-sufficiency. On the contrary, for Burke the natural condition of humankind is 
social and relational, and human nature is by nature artistic and creative: 
The state of civil society is a state of nature; and much more truly so than a savage and 
incoherent mode of life. For man is by nature reasonable; and he is never perfectly in his 
natural state, but when he is placed where reason may be best cultivated, and most 
predominates. Art is manÕs nature (Burke 1791: 108). 
In line with this thinking, Burke views rights as social and relational too, such as the right to 
property by descent, the right to due process (including trial by jury) and the right to education. In 
the Reflections, he contrasts these Ôreal rights of menÕ (Burke 1790: 59 [original italics]) with 
purely individual rights either in the state of nature, as for Rousseau, or in the artifice of political 
society, as for Hobbes. 
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If there is anarchy and violence in international relations, then the reason is the arbitrary 
division of humankind into isolated individuals and separate states whose existence is predicated on 
their sovereign power of dominion. According to Burke, this conception of the international brings 
about a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the premise of a violent state of nature leads to the 
institution of a logic that exacerbates rather than resolves disagreements: in the words of Burke, 
Ô[É] this artificial Division of Mankind, into separate societies, is a perpetual Source in itself of 
Hatred and Dissention among them. The Names which distinguish them are enough to blow up 
Hatred, and RageÕ (Burke 1993a: 28). In other words, the artifice of the sovereign state and the 
state-centric system reinforce some of humankindÕs worst inclinations towards egotism, greed, 
distrust and violence. 
BurkeÕs alternative to anarchy in the state of nature and to dominion in the artifice of political 
society can be traced to his search for an order in history. Such an order is neither reducible to a 
competition between sovereigns based on raison dÕtat (as in realism). Nor does it take the form of 
an imposed sanction based on fixed divine or natural law (as in idealism). Compared with these two 
traditions of theorising, there is a third tradition in which international order is considered to be 
immanent in the unfolding of history itself, and Burke is one of its principal proponents (Boucher 
1991; Fidler and Welsh 1999; Insole 2012). Beyond empirical realism and rationalist idealism, 
BurkeÕs close engagement with historical processes shifts the emphasis away from inductive 
observation and deductive speculation towards reflections on practice Ð on particular customs and 
habits that are embodied in the traditions of statesÕ associations with others and that reflect certain 
universal principles of humanity and justice. 
This centrality of Ôprincipled practiceÕ is at the heart of his search for a middle path between 
mere facts without theory (associated with empirical realism) and pure abstraction without practical 
meaning (associated with rationalist idealism). BurkeÕs characterisation of what distinguishes a 
statesman from a politician illustrates this well: ÔA statesman, never losing sight of principles, is to 
be guided by circumstancesÕ (quoted in Boucher 1991: 140); ÔA statesman forms the best judgement 
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of all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one before 
him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle result of themÕ (quoted 
in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 39). In the Reflections, the above-mentioned real rights of men are said to 
be found Ôin a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned (Burke 
2014a: 63 [original italics]). 
In BurkeÕs political theory of the international, the continuous search for a middle path is 
most clearly articulated in his reflections on BritainÕs mixed constitution, which is a fusion of 
classical with Christian ideas of sovereignty shared between the people, the Church and the Crown. 
Each represents a different principle of government Ð democracy, aristocracy and monarchy Ð and 
each is represented in Parliament, which in turn sustains the plurality of the political realm. As 
Burke explains, this reflects both universal truths in nature and particular arrangements in culture: 
the foundation of government is laid, not in imaginary rights of men (which at best is a 
confusion of judicial with civil principles), but in political convenience and in human 
nature; either as that nature is universal, or as it is modified by local habits and social 
aptitudes [É] These doctrines do of themselves gravitate to a middle point [É] That 
medium is not such, because it is found there; but it is found there because it is 
conformable to truth and nature [É] the whole scheme of our mixed constitution is to 
prevent any of its principles from being carried as far as, taken by itself and 
theoretically, it would go (Burke 1791: 140). 
The fundamental problem with the French Revolution is that it elevates one principle Ð the 
supposed Ôwill of the peopleÕ Ð over all others and thereby subverts the balance of the mixed 
constitution in favour of something like democracy by mob rule, which is allied to new forms of 
oligarchy, anarchy, demagogy and tyranny. 
For Burke, the absolutism of the French Revolution violates principles of humanity and 
justice. Human nature, like politics, is a question of balance between virtue and vice because human 
beings are capable of both good and evil. Since they are neither perfect nor beyond redemption, the 
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role of institutions is to encourage virtue and to limit vice. Prudence is the Ôfirst of all virtuesÕ 
(Burke 2014a: 63) and Ôthe God of this lower worldÕ (Fidler and Welsh 1999: 39). Unlike abstract 
moral precepts, virtues are universal principles that are embodied in particular practices, and this is 
how Burke conceives of prudence: ÔThe situations in which men relatively stand produce the rules 
and principles of that responsibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting itÕ (quoted in 
Boucher 1991: 141 [original italics]). The Ôprincipled practiceÕ of prudence applies as much to 
relations among individuals within a single society as it does to the relations between countries 
within the commonwealth of nations (as the following section will show). 
Linking BurkeÕs conception of humanity and justice is his invocation of natural law and 
divine authority. In his speeches on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Burke is adamant that 
there is no such thing as arbitrary power because it is not human will which determines legitimacy 
but instead God: Ôwe are all born in subjection Ð all born equally, high and low, governors and 
governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, preexistent law [É] by which we are knit and 
connected in the eternal frame of the universeÕ (Burke 2009: 478). Since this law is a gift from God 
and Ôall power is of GodÕ (Burke 1993c), it follows for Burke that the authority by which men rule 
over others is governed Ôthe eternal laws of Him that gave it, with which no human authority can 
dispenseÕ (Burke 2009: 478). These Ôeternal laws of justice, to which we are all subjectÕ (Burke 
2009: 479), provide the foundations for Ôthe laws of morality [that] are the same everywhereÕ 
(Burke 2009: 476). In other words, there are universal and immutable standards of justice that apply 
to all people irrespective of their particular culture. 
Both Michael Freeman and R.J. Vincent contend that references to God in Burke are less a 
reflection of theology than a function of sociology. FreemanÕs argument is that BurkeÕs reliance on 
religion is to do with social utility more than Christian metaphysics (Freeman 1980). And in the 
words of Vincent Ôthe legitimacy derived from this [GodÕs] delegation provided the reason for 
social solidarity instructing the habit of co-operation. But it was in the habitual end of this 
connection that Burke was chiefly interested: he was a sociologist of religion before he was a 
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theologianÕ (Vincent 1984: 207). However, these two interpretations do not square with BurkeÕs 
repeated appeals to God throughout his writings. Beyond mere rhetoric he argues that human 
beings, despite the Fall and the irruption of evil and sin, are capable of discovering the substance of 
natural law precisely because it has been mediated in history and through living traditions of 
wisdom. These cannot be purely man-made, as his distrust of reason and abstract principles clearly 
suggests.  
Instead, for Burke, human beings are creative because they are made in the image and 
likeness of the Creator. As social and religious animals, we as human beings Ð Burke writes in the 
Reflections Ð Ôknow, and what is better, we feel inwardly that religion is the basis of civil society 
and the source of all good and of all comfortÕ (Burke 2014a: 94). God not only created the universe 
but also governs its laws through His hand of providence. There is a universal reason that is internal 
to history, and human beings are able freely to discern its workings and their own destiny. 
Crucially, for Burke God is the ultimate source of our being and our capacity for moral action:  
If there be a God such as we conceive, he must be our Maker. If he is our Maker, there 
is a Relation between us. If there be a Relation between us some Duty must arise from 
that Relation, since we cannot conceive that a reasonable Creature can be placed in any 
Relation that does not give rise to some Duty (Burke 1993c: 82) 
As Boucher (1991) shows, Burke never developed a theory about how to distinguish universal 
principles from the general precepts of individual nations and cultures, but there is a governing 
philosophy of practice that emerges from his speeches and writings. Once again the trial of Hastings 
is instructive: Burke insists that the principle of all power having to be constrained by law can be 
found in both British and Indian traditions and that all constitutions have rules against arbitrary 
dominion and abuse of power precisely because they ultimately rest on traditions of wisdom and 
justice.  
I must do justice to the East. I assert that their morality is equal to ours, in whatever 
regards the duties of governors, fathers, and superiors; and I challenge the world to 
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show in any modern European book more true morality and wisdom than is to be found 
in the writings of Asiastic men in high trust, and who have been counsellors to princes. 
If this be the true morality of Asia, as I affirm and can prove that it is, the plea founded 
on Mr. HastingÕs geographical morality is annihilated (Burke 2009: 480).  
 
In summary: far from serving a merely social or sociological function, BurkeÕs references to 
God are central to his political conception of the international Ð a covenant between humanity and 
its Creator that is dimly reflected in covenantal relations among the generations of each nation and 
between the nations that form a commonwealth. In the words of Burke himself,  
We have obligations to mankind at large, which are not in consequence of any special 
voluntary pact. They arise from the relation of man to man, and the relation of man to 
God, which relations are not matters of pact. On the contrary, the force of all pacts 
which we enter into with any particular person or number of persons, amongst mankind, 
depends upon these prior obligations (quoted in Barth 1960: 34). 
 
2.2. BurkeÕs account of association 
Central to BurkeÕs account of the international is his conception of human beings as naturally linked 
to others by bonds of sympathy, which prevent fellow human beings from being Ôindifferent 
spectators of almost anything which men can do or sufferÕ (Burke 1993b: 68). Coupled with the 
passions of imitation and ambition, sympathy helps to produce an order that is not imposed upon 
some pre-existing chaos but rather emerges from nature. It does so by fusing a concern for others 
(sympathy) with following the example (imitation) of those who excel and can offer virtuous 
leadership (ambition). Even though they are Ôof a complicated kindÕ, these three passions Ôbranch 
out into a variety of forms agreeable to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of 
societyÕ (Burke 1993b: 68). 
Therefore the key difference between the social contract tradition based on an anarchic state 
of nature and BurkeÕs emphasis on Ônatural socialityÕ is that the latter evolves with the grain of 
  17 
humanity, starting with the innate desire of human beings to associate with one another. The 
primacy of association underpins BurkeÕs conception of community as expressed by his famous 
invocation of the Ôlittle platoonÕ:  
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is 
the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the 
series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind [É] We 
begin our public affections in our families. No cool relation is a good citizen (Burke 
2014a: 47 and 201). 
More fundamentally, Burke redefines the body politic as a Ôcommunity of communitiesÕ in ways 
that limit the power of both state and market institutions at home and abroad. On this basis Burke 
rejects the claim that international society is fundamentally anarchic Ð a global Ôwar of all against 
allÕ that mirrors the violent Ôstate of natureÕ at the national level. It is not so anarchic because the 
most primary ties, bonds, and connections between human beings are not confined to national 
borders. Against the New Whigs and their emphasis on individual rights and inter-state contracts, 
Burke emphasised ÔtraditionedÕ association as the most universal mode of human interaction. Here 
it is worth quoting him at some length: 
In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. 
We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act 
much more wisely when we trust to the interests of men as guarantees of their 
engagements [É]. Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to 
associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with 
individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as 
correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the 
force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They 
approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and sometimes against their 
intentions. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them 
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together even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, 
and fight, about the terms of their written obligations. [É] There have been periods of 
time in which communities, apparently in peace with each other, have been more 
perfectly separated than, in later times, many nations in Europe have been in the course 
of long and bloody wars. The cause must be sought in the similitude throughout of 
religion, laws, and manners. At bottom, these are all the same. The writers on public law 
have often called this aggregate of nations a Commonwealth (Burke 2014b: 316-17). 
In short, Burke inverts the modern priority of rights and contracts by arguing that the mutual moral 
obligations of interpersonal relations are more primary than abstract, formal and procedural 
standards imposed for either state-administrative or market-commercial purposes. The reason is that 
without such obligations the law will not lead to greater justice in the sense of properly ordered 
relations (as can be seen today with the lack of trust in public institutions and political processes). 
Crucially, for Burke this extends to ties across nominally sovereign states, which suggests 
there are commonwealths of nations in which the unity of the whole precedes the separateness of 
the individual parts. Underpinning the unity of each commonwealth are certain cultural traditions 
and customs. In the case of Europe, these include Ôthe spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of 
religionÕ (Burke 2014a: 81), as well as the Roman law of neighbourhood or vicinity. In one sense 
this law merely reflects the geographical circumstance of proximity in space. But in another sense it 
also expresses the historical circumstance of cultural connectedness over time, as well as other 
common factors such as politics, economics and religion. The point for Burke is that the law of 
vicinity implies mutual obligations: 
Now where there is no constituted judge, as between independent states there is not, the 
vicinage itself is the natural judge. It is, preventively, the assertor of its own rights; or 
remedially, their avenger [É]. This principle, which, like the rest, is as rue of nations, 
as of individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe, a duty to know, 
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and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a 
dangerous nuisance (Burke 2014b: 320). 
The French Revolution was one such ÔnuisanceÕ, which legitimated the intervention by FranceÕs 
neighbours in order to restore the original commonwealth of nations whose existence had been 
endangered by the usurping revolutionaries (Welsh 1995). BurkeÕs reasoning is that the unity of the 
whole is based on a solidarity between members who are equally free and independent but also 
equally committed to a substantive order. As Boucher (1991: 143) rightly remarks, Ô'the principle of 
interference' associated with the right of vicinage is for Burke 'the basis of the public law in 
Europe', but [É] there are severe limitations upon the exercise of this rightÕ. Thus Burke subscribed 
to a conception of pooled sovereignty, just because nations, like individuals, are not absolutely 
separated or self-sufficient but instead related and interdependent. 
At the same time, Burke argues that Ô[É] common-wealths are not physical but moral 
essences. They are artificial combinations, and, in their proximate efficient cause, the arbitrary 
productions of the human mind [É]Õ (Burke 2014b: 293). By Ôartificial combinationsÕ he means 
effects of human habit and creativity that blends nature with culture Ð the order of being with the 
order of knowing and ÔmakingÕ. Instead of formal first principles, Burke appeals to fundamental 
practices that are embedded in social relationships Ð the Ôcustoms, manners, and habits of lifeÕ that 
shape, and are shaped by, language, music, art, literary modes, fashions in conduct and dress as well 
as religion. Crucially, these cultural customs and human habits consist in the Ôprincipled practiceÕ of 
virtue such as prudent action (as defined above) and more generally the pursuit of the good that is 
internal to each human activity. Instead of formal first principles, Burke locates virtue in cultural 
customs and human habits, for example a sense of personal freedom that is allied with social 
stability: ÔThe liberty I mean is social freedom. It is that state of things in which liberty is secured 
by the equality of restraintÕ (Burke 2009: 507 [original italics]).  
Besides such embedded freedom, cultural customs and human habits also include social 
virtues such as generosity (rather than either greed or miserliness), courage (instead of recklessness 
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or cowardice), gratitude, loyalty, fraternity and friendship. In this way, Ôcustoms, manners, and 
habits of lifeÕ provide the bonds and ties that infuse the immanent political order with a 
transcendent, cosmic outlook. For Burke, that is because human nature is equally characterised by 
virtue and vice Ð the capacity to do good or evil Ð but unlike Hobbes he argues that there is a natural 
desire for goodness that culture (and institutions) can nurture. Such a Burkean perspective shifts the 
focus from an artificial commonwealth that coercively regulates natural violence (as for Hobbes) to 
a natural-cultural commonwealth that can uphold some measure of peace beyond conflict based on 
the principle of association. 
For example, faced with the absolutism of the French Revolution that sought to remake 
society in the image of new conception of humankind disembedded from culture and custom, Burke 
argued that 
It [Europe] is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law; with some 
diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of Europe have 
had the very same christian [sic] religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a 
little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and 
Ïconomy [sic] of every country in Europe has been derived from the same sources. It 
was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic customary; form the feudal institutions 
which must be considered as an emanation from that customary; and the whole has been 
improved and digested into system and discipline by the Roman law [É.] From this 
resemblance in the modes of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no 
citizen in Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more 
than a pleasing variety to recreate and instruct the mind; to enrich the imagination; and 
to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or resided for health, pleasure, business or 
necessity, from his own country, he never felt himself quite abroad (Burke 2014b: 317). 
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In the final instance, BurkeÕs vision is not really Eurocentric because Burke repeatedly 
emphasises the importance of inheritance in all cultural contexts. One of the main reasons for his 
radical critique of the French Revolution is the revolutionariesÕ disregard for institutions that are 
ultimately contingent products of specific historical circumstance Ð Ôthe gift of nature or of chanceÕ 
(Burke 2014a: 161). While there is an element of arbitrary human artifice involved in establishing 
institutions, it is nonetheless the case that our institutional inheritance should neither be distrusted 
nor dismissed. As Hampsher-Monk (2014: xxxv) notes,  
for Burke, the contrast is not (as it is for the radical) between an arbitrary set of 
institutions and a better, more rational set, but between having the good fortune to possess 
stable institutions at all and the anarchy that we risk from rejecting what Ôtime and 
chanceÕ have given us. Far from its being the case that stable institutions can be deduced 
from abstract principles, Burke thought that, in the absence of shared conventions Ð 
which only a specific historical culture provides Ð reason was incapable of deducing any 
specific arrangements. 
The following sub-section explores how BurkeÕs ÔassociationistÕ approach informed his analyses 
and political actions before the final section discusses a number of possible criticisms of a Burkean 
conception of IR. 
 
2.3 How BurkeÕs ÔassociationistÕ approach informed his analyses and actions 
BurkeÕs search for a middle path in international relations, which centres on cultural 
commonwealths, emerged in his discussions of the main international issues of his day. It also 
informed his analysis and actions in politics, notably on the question of Catholic emancipation in 
Ireland and American taxation, the French Revolution, and the British Empire in India. In each 
case, as this section shows, Burke sought to discern universal principles embodied in particular 
practices and in the process to develop his distinct theory of political action. 
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 On the Irish question, Fidler and Welsh (1999: 8) argue that BurkeÕs thinking and 
commitment was not driven by 
blind love for his native land. He proceeded on Irish policy within a framework that 
represented his perspective on imperial policy: toleration of the colonyÕs traditions, 
customs and culture; recognition of empire as a unity of purpose and interest; the 
importance of imperial free trade; the effect on English liberties of imperial activity; and 
the military and strategic dangers lurking in disgruntled colonies. 
Throughout his life the governing philosophy that underpinned BurkeÕs analysis of Ireland was 
shaped by a concern for justice and a more mutual arrangement with Britain, which reflected 
reciprocal obligations. Not only did he describe British policy as Ôunjust, impolitick [sic] and 
inefficaciousÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 8), provoking rebellions Ôthat were not produced 
by toleration, but by persecution; that they arose not from just and mild government, but from the 
most unparralled [sic] oppressionÕ (Burke 1993d: 99). He also denounced BritainÕs popery laws as 
resting on an Ôerroneous principleÕ: laws Ôagainst the majority of the peopleÕ that represent Ônot 
particular injustice but general oppressionÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 8).  
BurkeÕs revulsion against oppression runs through much of his writing, and it is of a piece 
with his opposition to both divine absolutism and popular tyranny. This position rests on his 
defence of mixed constitution for all parts of the British empire and, crucially, of a transcendent 
morality grounded in God: Ôthe principle of a superior Law [É] the will of Him who gave us our 
nature, and giving impressed an invariable law upon itÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 8). Far 
from being mere moralism, BurkeÕs appeal to a God-given standard of justice led him to reject both 
Protestant and Catholic sectarianism in favour of an affirmation of Ôour common ChristianityÕ Ð an 
inheritance of moral values and cultural practices of mutual respect that should unite Christians in a 
commonwealth of nations rather than entrench divisions and enmity. 
The idea of a Christian commonwealth also informed BurkeÕs qualified defence of empire 
precisely not as a system of dominion, oppression and exploitation (as in the case of BritainÕs policy 
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towards Ireland or HastingÕs actions in India). Instead he defended empire as a society of nations 
and peoples who, based on their shared religious faith, might covenant with each other in the 
interests of mutual benefit and shared wealth. This ÔassociationistÕ approach underpinned BurkeÕs 
advocacy of fair Ôfree tradeÕ rather than the non-reciprocal form of legalised piracy practiced by the 
East India Company or BritainÕs mercantilist policy of raising revenue from Ireland and the 
American colonies. More generally, Burke championed religious toleration and the enfranchisement 
of Irish Catholics not so much because these were abstract principles but because applying these 
principles in the historic context of his times was the best way to strengthen the cohesion of the 
imperial society with all its different members and their respective obligations. The failure of British 
policy to enact any of these principles meant that the commonwealth faced an existential threat from 
a lethal mix of French revolutionary violence, Irish Catholic rebellion against the empire and British 
repression based on the fear that Jacobinism would infect Ireland. 
On America, BurkeÕs position was guided by his defence of the ancient Ômixed constitutionÕ 
and its governing philosophy of a balance of interests. Specifically, he opposed the imposition of 
revenue-raising taxes on goods imported into America and argued for fairer free trade precisely 
because it reflected a more reciprocal arrangement in line with the spirit of the British constitutional 
settlement, limiting the powers of Parliament vis--vis the people in other lands and upholding 
mutual obligations rather than abstract rights. In his Speech on American Taxation, he enjoined his 
fellow Members of Parliament to remember  
the ancient policy and practice of the empire, as a rampart against the speculations of 
innovators [É]. Again, and again, revert to your old principles Ð seek peace and ensue it 
Ð leave America [É] to tax herself. I am not here going into the distinctions of rights 
[É] I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. 
Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy 
contest, will die along with it (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 15). 
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Burke also emphasised the interconnectedness of the empire by showing how the American tea 
embargo (in response to resistance against taxation) jeopardised the attempt to save the East India 
Company from financial ruin because it had previously exported tea to America without paying any 
duties. With his typically acerbic style, Burke remarked that Ôit is the same folly that has lost you at 
once the benefit of the West and of the EastÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 16).  
Central to BurkeÕs qualified defence of the empire was his emphasis on the common historical 
and cultural inheritance, which transmitted from generation to generation a series of intertwined 
principles that should guide policies and be refined through their enactment in political action. The 
guiding principles for Burke are a balance of interests, a restrained exercise of power and the 
upholding of liberty in line with equality and justice as part of cultural commonwealths. These 
principles shaped his thinking on the French Revolution, the American colonies and BritainÕs action 
towards India. In a famous letter to Charles-Jean-Franois Depont in November 1789, Burke writes 
that liberty Ôis not solitary, unconnected, individual, selfish liberty, as if every man was to regulate 
the whole of his conduct by his own will. The liberty I mean is social freedom. It is that state of 
things in which liberty is secured by the equality of restraintÕ (Burke 2009: 507 [original italics]). 
Similarly, Burke offers a substantive vision of imperial society in which the principle of liberty 
emerges from the cultural commonwealth of covenanted nations: 
My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, 
from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, 
though light as air, are as strong as links of iron [É] the wisdom to keep the sovereign 
authority of this country as a sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our 
common faith (Burke 2009: 220). 
Once again we can see how it is the transcendent morality given to us by God that underpins 
BurkeÕs analysis and his actions in Parliament. 
BurkeÕs conception of justice based on the principles of liberty and equality also shaped his 
thinking on BritainÕs crimes against India. For example, in the Ninth Report of the Select 
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Committee, Burke writes Ô[b]efore any remedial law can have its just operation, the affairs of India 
must be restored to their natural order. The prosperity of the natives must be previously secured, 
before any Profit from them whatsoever is attemptedÕ (Burke 2009: 427). Similarly, in the 1783 
Speech on FoxÕs East India Bill, Burke launched an extraordinary attack on the prevailing attitude 
among MPs towards the Indians. He called for restorative justice for the evils perpetrated by the 
East India Company, which is Ôdemanded from us by humanity, by justice, and by every principle 
of true policyÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 23). Attacking the Ôtotal silenceÕ of his fellows 
MPs Ôconcerning the interest and well-being of the people of IndiaÕ, he enjoined Parliament to 
abandon its contemptuous condescension for Indians who are Ônot gangs of savagesÕ but instead Ôa 
people for ages civilised and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we were yet 
in the woodsÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 23). 
Thus Burke invoked a sense of common humanity to argue for universal justice based on the 
twin principles of liberty and equality, which can be discerned in different cultures and civilisations. 
More generally, BurkeÕs speeches and writings both before and after the French Revolution were 
governed by a number of classical and Christian principles embodied Ð albeit imperfectly Ð in 
certain institutions and practices: the idea of local government that educates the citizenry to 
participate in the public realm; the idea of parliamentary scrutiny of government; the proportional 
participation of all classes of working people Ð not just property owners Ð in the affairs of the state; 
the right of the people to resistance as a last resort against unjustified tyranny; the idea of blending 
both authority and freedom by conceptualising the latter not as a rational right of the individual but 
rather as a system of both duties and privileges; the need for a renewable aristocracy that admits to 
its rank outstanding citizens and can thus assume the responsible leadership of the state with a view 
to the common good. 
While for Burke history is contingent and particular, it nevertheless discloses normative and 
universal standards that are ultimately the work of God. The case of the French Revolution 
occupied him so deeply because it revealed the violation of the idea of common humanity and 
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universal justice in the name of a perverted philosophy with its oscillation between dogmatic 
rationalism and impoverished empiricism. At the heart of his critique was the argument that the 
French Revolution represents a theoretically justified despotism that is even worse than the worst 
excesses of the ancient rgime. That is because it combines an abstract rationalism, which views 
humankind as disembedded from both nature and culture and which reduces society to a mechanical 
structure, with a proto-positivist commitment to absolute equality, which equates the citizenry with 
a homogenous mass of lone egos driven purely by self-interest. 
The unique contribution of BurkeÕs associationist approach to IR is to highlight the false 
choice between the divine absolutism of the ancient rgime and the secular tyranny of revolutionary 
France. Whereas the former failed to guarantee individual liberty and provide popular participation 
in government, the latter elevated the Ôwill of the peopleÕ above the classical and Christian idea of a 
balance of power without which there can be no plural polity. Despite these and other differences, 
both the old absolutism and the new tyranny were united in undermining the mediating institutions 
between the citizen and the state, bringing guilds, councils and corporations under direct central 
control. This left society atomised and individuals in a state of anomie, stripped of any real 
possibility for local self-government and personal affiliation to intermediary groups that are 
democratically self-governing. In short, Burked offered a qualified defence of perennial principles 
transmitted from Antiquity via the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the modern era because 
they reflected universal standards of common humanity and justice and also provided a better 
yardstick for both political action and policy. 
 
3. BurkeÕs associationist approach in question 
This section discusses two possible objections to BurkeÕs conception of the international: first of all, 
the claim that BurkeÕs position does not differ fundamentally from that of Grotius and that therefore 
Burke can be seen as part of the rationalist tradition of international theory (Wight 1991). Secondly, 
that BurkeÕs emphasis on culture and association might ignore problems ranging from an 
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essentialist conception of identity to a lack of relevance in todayÕs predominantly secular 
international system. 
 
3.1. On the fundamental differences between Grotius and Burke 
At first, BurkeÕs approach seems to echo GrotiusÕ political theology, as both thinkers reject the 
nominalist and voluntarist conception of God and the cosmic-political order (Burke 1993c; Grotius 
2006: 20-31, 2012: 30-45). This conception can be traced to influential Franciscans such as William 
of Ockham who argued that GodÕs will and power can undo the law of nature and subvert the 
created cosmos (Dupr 1993; Gillespie 2008; Pabst 2016). By contrast with Ockham, both Burke 
and Grotius defended an intellectualist vision according to which GodÕs reason and creative activity 
bring about a relational world composed of mutually related things, which is intelligible in terms of 
the unity of efficient and final cause in the divine source of all being. Unlike HobbesÕ asocial Ôstate 
of natureÕ, Burke shares GrotiusÕ conception views human beings as naturally desiring life in 
society and governing the polity as God rules over the cosmos (Burke 1993c; Grotius 1988). These 
and other similarities have led a number of scholars, including Martin Wight, to suggest that Burke 
is part of the rationalist tradition of IR thinking (Bull 1966; Wight 1991; in a much more qualified 
way, Vincent 1984). 
However, Grotius Ð as an Arminian Calvinist Ð developed a rationalist theology that in many 
ways runs counter to BurkeÕs thought. First of all, GrotiusÕ theology had the effect of sundering the 
natural light of reason from the supernatural light of faith and also separating rationality from 
feeling, habit, and the imagination (a separation that thinkers of the Renaissance and, later, Burke, 
T.H. Green and R.G. Collingwood sought to overcome). Connected with Grotian rationalism is his 
emphasis on the formality of the law as the main mediation between individuals within domestic 
politics and among states in the realm of international relations. This follows directly from his 
theological argument that God reigns over humankind by legislative command rather than by the 
outflow of love and the example of virtue embodied in Christ (Grotius 1988: 106-112; Grotius 
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1990; Grotius 2001: 159-263). The contrast with BurkeÕs accentuation of virtue and sympathy could 
hardly be more marked. 
It is true that Grotius does define states as particular instantiations of a larger unity which he 
describes in terms of the universal society established by nature.
2
 However, he nevertheless views 
this unity in primarily formal, legal terms Ð not a ÔthickÕ, substantive conception of the common 
good that includes yet also transcends law (as for Burke). Shaped by the experience of the religious 
wars and by intra-confessional disputes internal to Dutch Calvinism, Grotius invoked natural rights 
as a means to restore an original community of humankind that was destroyed by original sin and 
continues to be ridden by the violence between and among confessional states. For Grotius natural 
law provides the foundation for common norms that govern the polity, which might suggest that 
BurkeÕs position is Grotian after all. But Grotius views man as the bearer of individual, subjective 
rights, which reinforces the absolute power of the central sovereign (Grotius 2005, I: 300, II: 393) Ð 
a position that is incompatible with BurkeÕs emphasis on the mixed constitution. 
Even seemingly inalienable individual rights, such as the right to ownership or the power to 
delegate sovereignty to the ruler, are ultimately alienable for Grotius because property may be sold 
and delegation is irreversible. For inalienable individual rights are already defined in terms of 
subjective right (ius), independently of the right use (usus) and the objective purpose (finis). 
Although Grotius defends a strong notion of divinely ordained purpose such as peace and the unity 
of humankind, his political theology grants sovereign states such power over individuals and in 
relation to other states that this effectively rules out an overarching commonwealth of nations and 
peoples akin to BurkeÕs vision. That is because for Grotius there is no commonly agreed authority 
such as the imperium or the ecclesia (Pabst 2016) and not even a common Christian heritage 
(destroyed by what he saw as the corruption of Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy).  
It is the case that there was still a significant step from GrotiusÕ formalist conception of an 
international society of states to HobbesÕ anarchical Ôstate of natureÕ, but what binds them together 
is the rationalist primacy of formally sovereign individuals and states over a more mutualist cosmic-
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political order. BurkeÕs attempt to renew just such a conception marks him out as a distinct thinker 
who cannot easily be categorised according to WightÕs typology of the three (admittedly permeable) 
traditions of international theory Ð realism, rationalism and revolutionism (Wight 1991; cf. Bull 
1966). Vincent claims that Burke 
was all of them. He was a realist, for example, in recognizing that the balance of power 
was as much Ôan engine subservient to the designs of interested and ambitious personsÕ 
as a preserver of the unity of the international system. He was a rationalist in his belief 
in Ôobligations written in the heartÕ. And he was a revolutionist in signing up with the 
counter-Reformation. 
However, VincentÕs verdict ignores BurkeÕs repeated argument that power requires a higher 
authority than individual will or raison dÕtat and that a balance of power can only preserve the 
unity of the international system if it reflects standards of common humanity and universal justice. 
Moreover, BurkeÕs invocation of Ôobligations written in the heartÕ shifts the emphasis from 
rationalist arguments about laws, treaties and contract towards cultural practices that are foreign to 
rationalism. And BurkeÕs search for a middle path means that he kept a clear distance vis--vis the 
worst excesses of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation alike, as well as the ancient rgime 
and the French Revolution, so the label of ÔrevolutionistÕ makes little sense. 
BoucherÕs conclusion about Burke is much more accurate: Ôin the case of Burke we find the 
differing elements in constant tension, but because of his anti-rationalism and dislike for arbitrary 
power, in whatever sphere it may be exercised, we find that the historical criterion of state conduct 
wins out over the others [rationalism and idealism/revolutionism], but not always convincingly, nor 
unequivocallyÕ (Boucher 1991: 148). Boucher is right about the lack of a clear and distinct position 
and indeed a certain ambiguity in BurkeÕs thinking, but there are a number of constants that do run 
through his speeches and writings, as section two of this paper suggested. 
 
3.2. On essentialism and a lack of relevance 
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Was Burke an essentialist? And did he bequeath to us a conception of identity that is exclusivist and 
might legitimate a culturalised and even racialist politics of populism? There is no doubt that in an 
important sense Burke was a committed imperialist who spoke the language of Ôgovernors and 
governedÕ, imperialist rulers and their subjects, the ÔEuropean gentlemanÕ and the natives of India, 
as well as the Ôspirit of religionÕ and the Ôspirit of commerceÕ. These and other formulations seem to 
lend credence to the claim that Burke subscribed to a static and immutable identity, dividing 
humanity into exclusive groups based on cultural homogeneity. And it is certainly the case that 
Burke assumed a relatively homogenous culture across Europe, as evinced by the above-mentioned 
passage in which he describe Europe as Ôvirtually one great state having the same basis of general 
lawÕ and Ôthe very same Christian religionÕ. On this basis Burke seemed to restrict the reach of 
cultural commonwealth, limiting it to European civilisation and excluding not just India but also the 
Ôwholly AsiasticÕ Ottoman Empire from the international society and the European balance of 
power. 
All this raises questions about the ÔotherÕ in BurkeÕs social imaginary Ð all those who belong 
to different cultural traditions outside the bounds of European customs. In line with his search for a 
middle path, Burke neither imposes in an absolutist manner European standards on other parts of 
the world, nor does he retreat to a position of cultural relativism where all standards are equally 
valid. Instead, he appealed to notions of common humanity and universal justice based on natural 
law in his critique of BritainÕs policy towards India (as detailed in the previous section). Burke 
viewed each and every culture or civilisation as a distinct blend of universality and particularity. For 
example, EuropeÕs common cultural heritage gave rise to notions such as Ôlaws of nationsÕ (ius 
publicum europaeum) that rest on the fusion of Greco-Roman philosophy with Judeo-Christian 
ideas but are universally applicable as they concern all the nations. While BurkeÕs thinking was 
certainly shaped by the legacy of medieval Christendom, he nevertheless emphasised throughout his 
writings the dynamic nature of history and the development of practice that is transmitted across 
generations. In one of the most famous passages in BurkeÕs Reflections, he writes that society Ôis a 
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partnership [É] not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those 
who are dead, and those who are to be bornÕ (Burke 2014a: 101). So rather than describing Burke as 
an essentialist (if by that term we mean an eternal essence that is immutable and outside both time 
and space), it is perhaps more accurate to characterise his position as universalist Ð a defender of 
universal principles of humanity and justice that are mediated in particular practices, which can be 
found in all cultures Ð (formerly) Christian cultures as well as India and other civilisations. 
In turn, this raises a larger question about the relevance of BurkeÕs thought in the 
contemporary context (for a summary of the literature see Fidler and Welsh 1999: 57-67). Two key 
objections are, first, BurkeÕs focus on religion in a seemingly secular system of international 
relations and, second, his accentuation of common cultural heritage in an increasingly diverse 
world. A detailed treatment of both questions is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
contemporary religious resurgence is itself a global phenomenon that affects all continents, 
including parts of Europe (cf. Dawson 2013) Ð even if many Western countries are becoming more 
secular in terms of a declining in religious practice at the same time as witnessing a revival of 
religion in the public sphere (e.g. Davie 2002 and 2015). BurkeÕs thought reminds us that religion 
has not merely sociological significance but also concerns ontological questions about human 
nature that are perennial problems Ð including the propensity for both vice and virtue. 
Specifically, BurkeÕs ideas can help political and IR theory to rethink the potential for 
solidarity amid the process of globalisation and its blurring of the domestic and the international. 
BurkeÕs reflections are a reminder that both political action and economic activity not only take 
place in a social context but often build on a complex set of historical, legal, moral and religious 
factors, which underpin cooperation and solidarity and which globalisation can either foster or 
undermine. As Fidler and Welsh (1999: 67) conclude, Ôwhether globalization helps transform the 
'papers and seals' between states into 'obligations written in the hearts' of culturally heterogeneous 
peoples constitutes one of the great but enigmatic questions for the new millenniumÕ. BurkeÕs 
notion of cultural commonwealths is one way to conceptualise the combination of cultural diversity 
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with a commitment to universal standards of humanity and justice around Ôprincipled practicesÕ of 
mutual recognition, social freedom, generosity, loyalty and friendship.  
Far from reducing a polity to some essentialist identity, Burke argues that both political 
institutions and cultural customs evolve over time and are therefore able to adapt to change in ways 
that uphold civilised life rather than sliding into barbarism. For example, BurkeÕs injunction to 
search for a middle path can help avoid extremes such as individualism and nationalism in favour of 
more mutual arrangements based on new, shared identities. This involves seeing our fundamental 
identity beyond our individual selves and making personal sacrifices so that new, shared identities 
may be built and strengthened. Society is a covenant between generations that based on the right 
institutions and practices can balance freedom and autonomy with solidarity and care for others. 
One way to apply BurkeÕs thought today is to suggest that a society, which reflects humankindÕs 
social and relational nature, rejects the cult of rampant individualism and arbitrary restrictions on 
freedom that come with the cult of nationalism. 
A closely connected objection is that BurkeÕs emphasis on Ôcustoms, manners and habit of 
lifeÕ cannot help construct a more just international order than the one that is currently dominant. 
One critique of Burke (and this essayÕs reading of him) is that in the contemporary world, the bulk 
of political, economic and social transactions do occur at armsÕ length and that therefore Burke is 
wrong to focus on mutual obligations embodied in interpersonal relations because these are not 
more primary than abstract, formal and procedural standards upon which state and market processes 
rest. On the contrary, such standards real and they are desirable for the functioning of the 
international system. However, the counter-argument is that BurkeÕs point about Ôcommon cultureÕ 
stands: rights, contracts and the law (both domestic and international) on which they rest involve 
questions of culture, social relations and shared norms. For example, international law is interpreted 
and applied very differently depending on the cultural context, as in the case of certain Westerns 
states and countries such as Russia or China on questions of national sovereignty versus foreign 
intervention. Leaving aside double standards, there is a clash of cultures (not civilisations) between 
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a more liberal cosmopolitan outlook and a more conservative national outlook. Neither culture is 
able to create the conditions for trust and cooperation within the international system, while the 
imposition of one on the other will almost inevitable lead to violent conflict. 
BurkeÕs appeal to shared norms embedded in customs across different civilisations is one way 
to find common ground in an increasingly heterogeneous mix of cultures and religions. Indeed, 
Burke urges us to think together plurality based on universal principles that are embodied in 
practices as an alterative to hegemony based on particular cultural values that are imposed on 
others. As Vincent (1984: 214) writes, Ôthe raising of questions about the cultural underpinnings of 
the international political system can be placed in a Burkean tradition, and his own work remains a 
fruitful source for their investigationÕ. Crucially, one of BurkeÕs contribution to political and IR 
theory is to encourage a search for a ÔthickerÕ shared culture based on substantive (not merely 
procedural) values, and in the contemporary context this remains a key conceptual task. 
 
Concluding reflection 
This paper has argued that much of modern political and IR theory rests on a shared foundational 
premise Ð the idea that domestic politics and international relations are characterised by an original 
condition of anarchy, which can only be regulated by the artifice of a formal social contract and a 
systems of sovereign states governed by formal law. By contrast, the paper has tried to show that 
work of Edmund Burke provides an alternative conception of the international that focuses on the 
primacy of association Ð cultural and social bonds that are more primary than the social contract or 
the inter-state system of treaties and international law. Burke views associative ties not as socially 
constructed but rather as reflecting a natural order composed of custom, tradition and ultimately 
divine providence. Such an order gives rise to Ôcommonwealths of nationsÕ governed by a 
transcendent morality that for Burke is God-given. Identity is an organically evolving reality that is 
shaped by both ideas and material forces Ð notions of common humanity and universal standards of 
justice, which are mediated through history and embodied in particular practices of culture and 
human habit. 
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In terms of future research, three areas are of particular importance for IR theory. First, more 
works needs to be done on how the tradition of ÔassociationismÕ in the works of Burke (and the 
early writings of the English School of IR) can contribute not only to a normative analysis of the 
international system but also to a better understanding of its functioning Ð including factors such as 
human motivation that underpin causal explanations of international behaviour, or the role of 
culture in the operation of law, contracts and treaties. Connected to this is a second area, which 
concerns certain metaphysical and religious aspects about human nature that much of contemporary 
IR theory has assumed away in favour of either positivist approaches (going back to Comte) or 
transcendentalist conceptions (drawing on Kant). Does the ÔassociationistÕ tradition have conceptual 
resources to provide an alternative account of human nature and the socio-cultural embeddedness of 
individuals, (sub- and trans-national) groups and states, which might improve our understanding of 
key aspects of international relations? Third, could ÔassociationismÕ make a contribution to 
contemporary issues such as the relations between rights and obligations in international law and 
politics, or the role of cultural identity in the international system, or the tension between universal 
values and particular traditions? These and cognate questions will have to explored elsewhere. 
Given BurkeÕs focus on religion and transcendent morality, many scholars doubt his 
conception of the international has any relevance today. However, there is an ongoing debate about 
the sources of political order (e.g. Rengger 2000; Fukuyama 2012 and 2015) to which Burkean 
ideas might be able to make a distinct contribution, notably the role of cultural heritage and shared 
Ôprincipled practicesÕ amid the crisis of the dominant model of globalisation. Part of this crisis is a 
backlash against certain aspects of the liberal international order (Nye 2017; Niblett 2017), 
including a growing opposition between both liberal and anti-liberal identity politics. While there 
certainly is no moral or political equivalence between these positions, BurkeÕs legacy is a reminder 
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